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Abstract: This paper discusses the role of internal corporate ratings as a means by which 
commercial banks condense their informational advantage and preserve it vis-à-vis a competitive 
lending market. In drawing on a unique data set collected from leading universal banks in Germany, 
we are able to evaluate the extent to which non-public information determines corporate ratings. As 
a point of departure, the paper describes a sample of rating systems currently in use, and points at 
methodological differences between them. Relying on a probit analysis, we are able to show that the 
set of qualitative, or soft, factors is not simply redundant with respect to publicly available accounting 
data. Rather, qualitative information tends to be decisive in at least one third of cases. It tends to 
improve the firms’ overall corporate rating. In the case of conflicting rating changes, i.e. when 
qualitative and quantitative rating changes have opposing signs, quantitative criteria dominate the 
overall rating change. Furthermore, the more restrictive the weighting scheme as part of the rating 
methodology is, the stronger is the impact of qualitative information on the firms’ overall rating. The 
implications of our results underline the need to define stringent rating standards, from both a risk 
management and a regulatory point of view. 
 
Keywords: Corporate rating, long-term lending, financial intermediation, information aggregation, 
credit risk management. 
JEL classification: G21 
                                                 
1   This paper is part of Center for Financial Studies industry project on „Credit risk management in Germany“, a 
joint research project involving leading commercial banks in Germany (Bayrische Hypo Vereinsbank, 
Deutsche Bank, DG Bank, Dresdner Bank, and Westdeutsche Landesbank) and finance faculty and Ph.D. 
students from the Universities of Frankfurt, Mannheim and Munich. We are very grateful to their support and 
their comments. Special thanks to Ralf Elsas, Ralf Ewert, Frank Vossmann and Bernd Rudolph. 
 
*   Humboldt Universitaet Berlin and CFS Center for Financial Studies, Frankfurt (Main).  e-mail: 
abrunner@wiwi.hu-berlin.de 
#   University of Frankfurt and CFS Center for Financial Studies and CEPR Centre for Economic Policy Research. 
Tel.: +49-69-798 22568, e-mail: krahnen@wiwi.uni-frankfurt.de (corresponding author) 
§   University of Mannheim. Tel.: +49-621-181-1532, e-mail: weber@bank.bwl.uni-mannheim.de Information production in credit relationships 
  2 
1  Introduction 
The technology of risk assessment through corporate ratings has received considerable attention 
recently. Risk managers and regulators around the world now share the view that banks ought to 
meet minimum capital requirements that are sensitive to all the risks borne, including interest rate risk 
and credit risk [Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 1999, 2000]. Not surprisingly, the past 
decade has seen a surge of academic and non-academic studies on banks’ risk management. This 
work has been concerned primarily with the measurement and management of interest rate risk. 
Recently, the emphasis has shifted towards work, both theoretical and policy oriented, on the 
management of credit portfolios, and on the integration of market and credit risk [Saunders 1999]. 
For all these issues, the accessability of individual rating data and their histories, either from rating 
agencies or from bank-internal rating activities, is a basic requirement.  
In this paper, we will take a closer look at the methodologies and experiences used in the German 
banking industry in order to assess expected default risk of their corporate clients. In particular, we 
want to know what types of information are being used to determine corporate ratings, and how 
important they are in defining the final rating attribution. The empirical part of the paper builds on a 
special data set compiled at the Frankfurt-based Center for Financial Studies [see Elsas et.al. 1998 
for details]. It contains detailed information about corporate ratings generated by commercial banks. 
The present study along with a companion paper [Weber/Krahnen/ Vossmann 1999] explore the 
economic function of internal corporate ratings. The paper also discusses the economic function of 
these ratings in the context of the theory of financial intermediation.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 will derive a working hypothesis for 
the empirical sections. In doing so, we will survey the relevant literature and relate it to the theory of 
banking. Section 3 gives a brief overview of the rating methodologies currently used by German 
commercial banks, explaining their common features. Emphasis is on the use of qualitative and 
quantitative data within the framework of the more general scoring model. Section 4 presents basic 
descriptive statistics of our data set. Section 5 concentrates on the main issue of this paper, i.e. the Information production in credit relationships 
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significance of hard (quantitative) and soft (qualitative) factors as determinants of the overall rating
2. 
Finally, Section 6 summarizes the results and draws conclusions. 
2  Rating as a core bank business: Towards a working hypothesis 
A helpful first theoretical consideration is the comparison between a corporate bond and a bank 
loan. On this issue, there is an extensive literature that concentrates on the informational role played 
by banks and markets [see Thakor 1995 for a survey]. Diamond (1991) stresses the importance of 
credibility of information. It serves to explain why firms with ample public information, notably large 
firms, will have lower capital costs by tapping the bond market. Firms with less public information, in 
contrast, will prefer financial intermediaries as financiers. As argued by Rajan (1992), their 
comparative advantage with respect to the production of information is concerned with pre-
contractual screening and post-contractual monitoring. We will discuss bond financing and loan 
financing in turn. 
Bond financing relies, according to this literature, on a high degree of public information. It is typically 
provided by external agencies, like Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s. Their corporate ratings are 
regularly updated, and they are publicly known. The specific rating notches, ranging from AAA 
down to D in the case of Moody’s, for example, can be regarded as the attribution of an estimated 
default probability (POD) over a well-defined horizon (the next 12 months, say). Note that the value 
of the expected loss given default is not part of the rating information itself.  
Of course, publication of a particular corporate rating conveys information to ordinary market 
participants, and helps to reduce asymmetries of information on the market. Based on the contractual 
details of the loan agreement, information on the default probability (POD) forms an important factor 
in determining the expected repayment and becomes thus a basis for determining the nominal interest 
rate in a lending agreement. Public rating will contribute directly to the price formation process on the 
market, provided that they are reliable [Hand/Holthausen/Leftwich 1992]. The question of a rating‘s 
reliability is very important here. It depends ultimately on the competitive structure of the market for 
                                                 
2  The terms corporate rating, creditworthiness and overall rating are used synonymously in the text. Information production in credit relationships 
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rating information. If it is competitive and rating companies are free to set their prices, theory predicts 
an inverse relationship between the rating class (ranging from high to low quality) and the effective 
interest rate of the bond in question (ranging from high to low rates). The inverse relationship 
between rating and bond return reflects the economic value of an agency’s reputation. Empirical 
studies have, to a large degree, confirmed the h ypothesized inverse relationship between agency 
ratings and bond spreads [Blume/Lim/MacKinlay 1998, Datta et al. 1999].  
Now let us turn to loan financing. With no public rating information available, the development of an 
active secondary market is severely hampered. Since investors do not have specific estimates of 
default probabilities, an adverse selection process will lead to market failure. Even if there is a 
financial intermediary involved, the argument remains unchanged. Assuming that an intermediary who, 
based on his private information, is able to estimate the risk without bias, enters the market wishing 
to sell part of his loan portfolio, he is likely to have to accept a major discount. These mark-downs 
compensate the buyers of such loans for the expected risk taken, including the behavioral risk 
resulting from the intermediary's incentive to provide false information. In the absence of public 
ratings, loans can therefore only be sold on the market if the price is marked down from its "true" 
value. For this reason, loans are often referred to as illiquid assets in the literature on financial 
intermediation [see Diamond 1991]
3. 
According to this argument, the illiquidity of the loan portfolio is a typical feature of commercial 
banking. Efficiently selecting and monitoring borrowers explains a positive spread between the 
secondary market price of loans and its primary market price. While the former price is observable, 
resulting from the purchase and sale of the loan on a credit market, the latter is u nobservable, 
depending on the bank’s portfolio. Any company-specific information obtained in the course of the 
lending relationship is aggregated into the bank's corporate credit rating. Internal ratings should 
therefore be seen as private information. Typically, banks do not inform their customers of the 
internal ratings or the implied PODs, nor do they publicize the criteria and methods used in deriving 
them.  
                                                 
3   An example supporting our claim is the emerging market of asset-backed securities, with credit portfolios as 
underlyings, because, in ABS transactions, only part of the entire portfolio (typically with the exception of the 
equity tranche) is actually put on the market.  Information production in credit relationships 
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At this point, we conclude that for both types of debt, market-traded bonds and non-traded loans, 
the information available can be processed into a rating, either public or private. Both types of ratings 
give an estimate of the probability of default (POD). For the remainder of our analysis we will 
concentrate on private ratings, generated by banks. These ratings result from the aggregation of all 
borrower-related information privately available in the bank. Private corporate ratings thus may 
contain the information-related substance of the lending relationship. We can summarize our informal 
theoretical discussion as a working hypothesis:  
Private corporate ratings (internal ratings) reflect the core business of commercial banks, 
whose superior information as compared to an external assessment by the market allows a 
more precise estimate of the POD.  
Our working hypothesis motivates the direction of the empirical analysis. What is eventually needed 
is a measure for the private information content in internal ratings. In deriving an appropriate 
measure, the different rating methodologies used by the banks have to be described and calibrated 
(see also Weber/Krahnen/Vossmann 1999). On a general level, internal bank ratings are based on 
the concept of a scoring procedure, as outlined in further detail in Section 3. Typically, the overall 
rating for a specific borrower results from the aggregation of a number of sub-ratings (criteria), using 
a linear weighting function. In its most general form the weighting may be achieved in a non-linear 
fashion, e.g. by a neural network .  
A distinction is usually made between two types of ratings: the borrower rating and the actual loan 
rating. The former indicates borrower's risk of default, while the latter also takes into account the 
individually agreed loan collateral. Therefore, a loan rating generally cannot be worse than the 
borrower rating. In this study, we concentrate on borrower ratings because they contain information 
on the borrower's risk of going bankrupt only, while the loan ratings also incorporate details of the 
loan agreement. The latter may therefore vary enormously for different lenders to the same customer, 
when for instance collateral differs among lenders.  
Assuming that ratings imply an estimate for the borrower's PODs, the question to be answered is 
which criteria determine the POD forecast. Although there are many different sub-ratings, we will 
concentrate on two classes of sub-ratings and their contribution to the total score: objective and 
subjective criteria. The former class is based on objective information, including “hard” accounting Information production in credit relationships 
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data (balance sheet and income statement), which is supposed to indicate a company's economic 
situation, and which contains mainly past information. The latter class is more subjective in nature, 
leaving judgemental discretion to the person in charge of the rating process. It comprises assessments 
of the present and future trends of the industry and the company itself. Most importantly, this class 
also includes evaluations of the management of the company being assessed. Typically, the 
information used here is “soft” and forward-looking.  
Since private information not yet available in the public domain will, by its very nature, be primarily 
used with subjective criteria, these are of particular importance in identifying the informational value 
of bank-internal ratings. To the extent that lenders can obtain information on the basis of their long-
term and intensive relationship with the customer earlier than the (bond) market, the "soft" criteria 
may contribute to an informational lead with respect to those assessments based solely on publicly 
available information. "Soft" criteria thus play a decisive role in determining the value added of bank-
internal ratings.  
3  How German commercial banks rate corporate clients: A first look  
The 1990s saw a substantial change in the methodology of internal bank rating procedures, thus 
calling for a comparison of different rating systems and development trends. During the course of this 
decade, all five of the German commercial banks in our sample either revised their rating systems or 
introduced standardized rating procedures for the first time. Proceeding from estimates of 
creditworthiness, some of which are only verbal, or ratings based on holistic assessments, or even 
the existing scoring-based rating systems, current internal rating procedures used by the banks listed 
here are now all based on what is known as the scoring procedure [see Weber/Krahnen/Vossmann 
1999 for further details].  
( ) ( ) ￿ =
i i i i a v k a v   (1) 
Scoring models can be characterized by the criteria i to be assessed, and a pre-specified value 
functions {vi}. In addition, the scoring model is characterized by an aggregation rule, which assigns 
weights  ki to the individual criteria and aggregates these by means of an algebraic rule, usually 
additive, to form the overall score v(a) [Weber/Krahnen/Weber 1995]. If the overall score and the Information production in credit relationships 
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rating are not the same by definition, the rating is determined by assigning the overall score to a given 
risk class. 
The bank-internal rating procedures based on scoring methods differ in terms of their criteria 
catalogues, rating scales, aggregation rules, and in particular, the choice of weighting factors.  
The criteria catalogue 
The criteria catalogues of the individual procedures differ greatly. For example, the banks mentioned 
here incorporate between 4 and 18 criteria in their scoring function.
4 Among these evaluation criteria 
there are, for each bank, both quantitative and qualitative criteria. We define a criterion to be 
quantitative, if its evaluation is based on published accounting  data, as for instance cash flow, 
earnings, debt-equity ratio, short-term and long-term debt, and so forth. These criteria are typically 
backward-looking. On the other hand, we define a criterion to be qualitative if its evaluation is based 
partly or entirely on non-published or subjective attributions; it is typically forward-looking. 
Examples comprise the general prospects of an industry, sales forecasts, liquidity planning, marketing 
strength and, most importantly, management quality and continuity, the g eneral evaluation of the 
customer relationship.  
A comparison in Table 1 shows that banks typically differ very little from the international rating 
agencies S&P and Moody’s with regard to the catalogue of criteria they use in assessing borrowers’ 
creditworthiness. The criteria catalogue of the "typical bank" was created based on the five bank-
internal rating procedures we analyzed. Account maintenance is the only bank-specific criterion and 
it is particularly relevant in cases of long-term customer relationships.  
                                                 
4  If the rating procedure contains a small number of criteria, each criterion usually has a list of determining 
factors that are to be considered in the evaluation, without each factor having to be evaluated by being 
assigned to a risk class. Information production in credit relationships 
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S&P  Moody’s  "Representative bank" 
Financial risk: 
•  Balance sheet and accounting 
•  Financial policy 
•  Profitability 
•  Capital structure 
•  Cash flow 
•  Financial flexibility 
Finance management risks: 
•  Cash flow 
•  Liquidity 
•  Debt structure 
•  Equity capital and reserves 
Economic circumstances: 
•  Operating position 
(cash flow, profitability, etc.) 
•  Financial position 
(equity ratio, liquidity, etc.) 
Business risk: 
•  Industry features 
•  Competitive position 
Competitive and operating risks: 
•  Relative market share / 
competitive situation 
•  Diversification 
•  Sales, costs, operating result 
•  Sales volume and purchasing 
Corporate structure and legal 
risks: 
•  inclusion of associated 
companies  
Corporate situation: 
•  Sector evaluation 
•  Market position/competition 
•  Product/range 
•  Special risks 
•  Forecasts/sales revenue and 
liquidity planning  
•  Corporate structure 
•  Management 
 
 
Management quality: 
•  Planning and control  
•  Management experience 
•  Organizational structure 
•  Successor organization 
Management: 
•  Experience 
•  Succession 
•  Quality of accounting/ 
controlling  
    Customer relationship /  
Account management 
Table 1:  Criteria catalogues of major rating agencies and a representative bank
5 
The rating scale  
The rating scales of the criteria and the overall scores of the individual models in our sample 
comprise between 5 and 10 risk classes, less than the 16 risk classes found at Moody’s and S&P 
system. The rating scales for the sub-criteria and the total score do not necessarily have the same 
number of notches.  
                                                 
5  The evaluation criteria given in Table 1 aim to highlight the areas of agreement of the criteria lists of the 
various models. These show the main points of the individual procedures, the number of which cannot be 
assessed. Cf. Berblinger 1996, Meyer-Parpart 1996. Information production in credit relationships 
  9 
The aggregation mechanism 
Some of the methods used are single-stage and therefore correspond to the scoring procedure in its 
simplest form, i.e. the criteria are assigned scoring points, which are then aggregated by means of the 
weighting function to form the overall score (equation 1), which either corresponds to the borrower 
rating or can be used to derive it (by assigning a risk class). However, four of the five banks studied 
use two-stage models, containing two aggregation rules. The scores assigned to the criteria are, as 
shown in equation 2, aggregated to form a number of intermediate scores vj(aj), which are then 
collated by means of a second rule to form the overall score. 
Single-stage rating:  ( ) ( ) ￿ =
i i i i a v k a v   (1) 
Two-stage rating:  ( ) ( ) ( ) ￿ ￿ ￿ = =
j i ji ji ji j j j j j a v k k a v k a v   (2) 
An important structural feature of bank-internal rating procedures is the weighting scheme used. 
Apart from the identification of criteria of relevance to the borrower rating, the choice of weighting is 
decisive for a reliable estimation of the expected probability of default (POD).  
In practice, the aspect of weighting is usually given very little consideration. Although, based purely 
on intuition, the impact of individual criteria on the expected probability of default should differ in 
extent, an undifferentiated weighting can be seen in our data set in 2 out of the 5 cases (i.e. uniform 
weighting). Another bank leaves the choice of the weighting factors to the decision-maker, on a case 
by case basis. This is virtually an holistic estimation of the company’s creditworthiness, unless the 
decision maker’s freedom in setting the weighting function is restricted in another way.  
The success of the POD forecasts also depends on the structural features of the rating model, and on 
its procedural efficiency and unbiasedness. Here, the evaluation of the individual criteria through 
assignment to a particular risk class plays a special role. In the case of qualitative criteria, the 
decision-maker has comparatively more freedom in making an assessment, due to the subjectivity of 
such an evaluation and the inability to verify the result. By utilizing this leeway, a weighting fixed ex-
ante can effectively be transformed, yielding a biased POD forecast. For this reason as well, the 
following section will focus particularly on the differences in the evaluation of objective and subjective 
criteria.  Information production in credit relationships 
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4  Database and Descriptive Statistics  
4.1  Database 
The analyses performed in this study are based on the rating data from three banks
6 (A, B and C) 
which were collected in accordance with the following requirements.  
The parent population of borrowers comprised only corporate customers, subject to commercial 
accounting requirements, from the trading, mechanical engineering and software industries who had 
taken out loans with our banks totalling at least DM 100,000. The sampling period was to cover at 
least three successive years. The scope of survey was such that each bank was to take a random 
sample of 200 borrowers from each of the three sectors. This was to be done either by random 
selection on the basis of the last digit of the account number or by counting every k
th borrower. If the 
parent population in a sector was less than 200 cases, the survey was to be performed on them all.
7 
In addition to the overall ratings, the data to be recorded also included all sub-ratings in keeping with 
the relevant bank-internal rating procedure.  
The following Table 2 shows an overview of the number of borrowers with respect to the industry, 
bank, and year for which a borrower rating was observed. The column "1993-97" contains the 
overall number of borrowers per sector and bank for which there is at least one rating observation 
between 1993 and 1997. The subsequent Table 3 contains the rating changes observed per bank 
and industry. 
                                                 
6  The remaining three of the six banks involved in the survey are not included in this empirical study because of 
the lack or incompleteness of their data. They are, however, included in the illustration of the various internal 
bank rating procedures.  
7  The exceptionally high number of Bank C borrowers from the trade sector occurred due to matters of data 
collection in Bank C. Implications cannot be drawn from this observation. Information production in credit relationships 
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Bank  Industry  1993-97  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997 
A  Trade  226  72  163  170  185  65 
  Mechanical engineering  190  54  134  154  160  56 
  Software  112  44  81  86  94  38 
  Total  528  170  378  410  439  159 
B  Trade  4,267  -  2,847  3,262  307  - 
  Mechanical engineering  559  -  348  439  45  - 
  Software  147  -  83  116  9  - 
  Total  4,973  -  3,278  3,817  361  - 
C  Trade  200  -  -  200  196  158 
  Mechanical engineering  200  -  -  200  199  175 
  Software  137  -  -  99  126  107 
  Total  537  -  -  499  521  440 
Table 2:  Number of ratings observed for individual borrowers per bank, industry, year
8 
Bank  Industry  1993/94  1994/95  1995/96  1996/97 
A  Trade  49  129  136  44 
  Mechanical engineering  33  116  129  38 
  Software  34  61  69  23 
  Total  116  306  334  105 
B  Trade  -  1,891  229  - 
  Mechanical engineering  -  234  33  - 
  Software  -  54  7  - 
  Total  -  2,179  269  - 
C  Trade  -  -  196  154 
  Mechanical engineering  -  -  199  174 
  Software  -  -  97  103 
  Total  -  -  492  431 
Table 3:  Observed rating changes over a one year horizon 
For all three banks, the sub-ratings and overall ratings were observed, although for Bank B this 
related only to the two sub-ratings at the second aggregation stage after the prior aggregation of the 
original sub-ratings. As Tables 2 and 3 also show, the data set of Bank B –with a total of 4,973 
                                                 
8  If several ratings were calculated for a borrower in one year, this study uses only the last rating drawn up in 
that year. Information production in credit relationships 
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borrowers– is a lot larger than the that from the other banks. Nevertheless, the rating changes 
observed for 1995/96 decrease to 269.  
4.2  Descriptive Statistics 
Systematic differences can be identified in the evaluation of individual criteria using the distribution of 
the borrowers' sub-ratings. As an example, Figures 1 to 3 show the frequency distributions of a 
quantitative sub-rating and a qualitative sub-rating for each of the three banks (A, B, C), as well as 
the median, the 25% and 75% quantile as measures of central tendency and the variance as the 
parameter of dispersion. The two sub-ratings are "operating profitability" (an objective assessment) 
and "management quality" (a subjective assessment) for Bank A, "economic situation" (objective) 
and "corporate situation" (subjective)
9 for Bank B, and "debt-equity ratio" (objective)  and 
"management assessment" (subjective) in the case of Bank C. 
The rating system of Bank B consists of five risk classes, with risk class 1 indicating the lowest risk 
of default and risk class 5 indicating the highest risk. Bank C's rating procedure has two separate 
rating scales for the sub-ratings (4 risk classes) and the overall rating (10 risk classes). We have 
standardized the rating scale of the overall rating from ten to four risk classes. Bank A has eight risk 
classes for both sub-ratings and the overall rating. Here, rating scales were transformed to four risk 
classes in order to achieve more comparability with other rating systems. 
10. Figures 1 to 3 illustrate 
the assignment of the individual risk classes for each sub-rating viewed and also for the overall ratings 
in the form of relative frequencies. 
                                                 
9  The overall rating for Bank B is composed only of these two sub-ratings.  
10  To make the procedures clearer and easier to compare, the number of risk classes was reduced from eight to 
four by combining every two classes. The sub-ratings of Bank C each comprise four risk classes, while the 
level of creditworthiness has ten. Here, too, classes were combined to reduce them to four in number. Classes 
A+, A, A- were combined to form risk class 1, B+, B, B- were combined to form risk class 2, etc. Information production in credit relationships 
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n=410  Average  Variance  25% quantile  Median  75% quantile 
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Operatg. pos.  2.56  0.86  2  2  3 
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Figure 1:  Relative frequencies of Bank A's rating assignments, 1995 (n=410) 
* The number of rating classes has been transformed to from eight to four. 
 
Bank B, 1995 (n=3,817) 
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Figure 2:  Relative frequencies of Bank B's rating assignments, 1995 (n=3.817) 
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Bank C, 1995 (n=499) 
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n=499  Average  Variance  25% quantile  Median  75% quantile 
Management, etc. 2.17  0.55  2  2  2,5 
Liable equity ratio  2.69  1.32  2  3  4 
Borrower rating  2.27  0.62  2  2  3 
 
Figure 3:  Relative frequencies of Bank C's rating assignments, 1995 (n=499) 
* The number of overall rating’s risk classes has been transformed from ten to four.  
Evaluation differences between hard and soft criteria are evident in the mean value of the sub-ratings, 
and through differences in dispersion. All figures support the claim that soft criteria are rated more 
positively on average than hard criteria. Moreover, the dispersion of hard sub-ratings, measured by 
the variance, is more than twice the dispersion of the soft sub-ratings in all three cases. The decision-
makers are not making full use of the evaluation range available in the subjective area and tend to 
allocate better risk classes, with lower implied probabilities of default. In addition, for Bank B it can 
be noted that the extreme categories 1 and 5 are avoided in the evaluation of soft criteria.  
The hypothesis of a different evaluation of hard and soft criteria  can be checked using the 
Kolmogoroff-Smirnoff test statistic which is a distribution-free test of differences between distribution 
functions. The two sub-ratings are taken as two independent random samples of frequency data. We 
test the null that both samples originate from the same parent population and are thereby subject to 
the same distribution, i.e. H 0: F(xQN) = F(xQL), where F(xQN) designates the distribution function of Information production in credit relationships 
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the quantitative sub-rating and F(xQL) that of the qualitative sub-rating.
11 For all three banks, the null 
hypothesis can be rejected at the 1% level. Thus, in all three cases, the qualitative sub-rating is 
stochastically smaller  –indicating less default risk– than the quantitative sub-rating. This result 
confirms the hypothesis of a more positive evaluation of qualitative criteria 
[Weber/Krahnen/Vossmann 1999]. 
5  Private information as rating determinants  
This section will examine the main hypothesis on the role of qualitative information in the derivation of 
ratings. To this end, we propose a technique that permits us to record the contribution of individual 
sub-ratings to the aggregated overall rating. This contribution will then serve as a measure of the 
decision-oriented importance of the criteria in question.  
The relevance of a criterion to the overall rating results not only from its absolute or relative weight in 
the scoring function but also from its "marginal" contribution
12 to the overall rating. The marginal 
contribution of any criterion X may be zero even though it has a positive weight in the aggregation 
function. As an example, let us suppose criterion X has the value 4 (on a scale from 1 to 10) and the 
weight 0.8. It is thus considered to be of major importance. Criteria Y and Z, considered to be of 
minor importance, have values 3 (0.1) and 5 (0.1) respectively. The overall score S for all three 
criteria is the weighted sum of all criteria, S(X,Y,Z) = 4. If one criterion is omitted and the weights of 
all others are adjusted proportionally, we have S(X,Y)=3.89, S(X,Z)=4.11 and S(Y,Z)=4. The 
exclusion of criterion X from the set of all criteria does not alter the overall score. Criterion X is said 
to be irrelevant for the overall rating, despite its 80% contribution to the weighting function.  
The analysis below is based on the differentiation into qualitative and quantitative sub-ratings as the 
first layer below the overall ratings. We have chosen this level as the subject of the study because we 
are primarily interested in the explanatory contribution of the totality of the qualitative criteria. At 
present, we have no reasonable indication for a further differentiation of the qualitative criteria in 
                                                 
11  The term "quantitative (qualitative) sub-rating" describes the sub-ratings shown in Figures 1 to 3. The rating 
procedure of Bank A contains several other quantitative and qualitative sub-ratings in addition to these, while 
the rating procedure of Bank C contains another qualitative sub-rating.  
12  "Marginal" is in quotation marks because the characteristic values are discrete. Information production in credit relationships 
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terms of their potential informational contribution within the framework of long-term credit 
relationships.  
5.1  The impact of qualitative criteria on borrower ratings 
First, we will investigate the hypothesis that the soft sub-rating contributes no additional information 
to determining the overall rating and is thereby redundant. The test is performed first by means of 
descriptive statistics and then by a more formal econometric test. Figure 4 shows for Bank B the 
frequency distribution of the rating deviations l between the hard sub-rating and the overall rating 
(borrower rating), where as before the hard sub-rating collates all quantitative, financial statement-
related information on the borrower
13. The rating deviation  l is defined as sub-rating QN ./. 
borrower rating BR. Therefore, a numerical value of l=1 implies that the borrower rating is one risk 
class lower, i.e. better, than the quantitative sub-rating. Figures 5 and 6 show corresponding 
overviews for the other two banks (A and C).  
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Figure 4:  Rating deviations l for Bank B, 1995 (n=3.817) 
                                                 
13  The hard sub-rating differs from the borrower rating (overall rating) in that it does not take any soft 
information into account. For one bank, with no fixed weights in the scoring function, weights were 
approximated by an OLS estimate.  Information production in credit relationships 
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Figure 5:  Rating deviations l for Bank A*, 1995 (n=410) 
* Number of risk classes has been transformed to four classes.  
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Figure 6:  Rating deviations l for Bank C*, 1995 (n=499) 
* Number of risk classes has been transformed to four classes.  
Given the distributions of the rating deviations in the diagrams, we can make two statements. First, 
qualitative criteria are particularly significant in causing deviations of the overall rating from the 
quantitative sub-rating. In the unweighted average of the three banks, they have an impact on the 
overall borrower rating for 45 of 100 borrowers, measured by the deviation of the overall rating Information production in credit relationships 
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from the quantitative sub-rating,. The individual values are 29% for Bank A*, 51% for Bank B and 
53% for Bank C*.
14  
The second point is the distribution of the deviations of the overall rating from the quantitative sub-
rating induced by the qualitative sub-rating, i.e. the marginal effect of the qualitative sub-ratings, 
distributed asymmetrically around zero. On average, this results in an upgrade of the overall rating 
through the assignment of a lower rating class ( 0 > l ). It can be seen that both the frequency of 
such rating deviations as well as the positive bias are hogher in rating systems with fixed weights 
(Bank B and C). For these systems, this is  24 . 0 = B l  and  43 . 0 = C l  respectively, as opposed to a 
value of  13 . 0 = A l  for the system used at Bank A, which does not use preset weights.  
The Wilcoxon signed-rank test
15 can be used to test whether the observed rating deviations are 
distributed symmetrically around a median of zero. Under the null hypothesis, the differences l stem 
from a parent population with the distribution function F(l) and the density function f(l), where 
F(+l)+F(-l)=1 or f(+l)=f(-l). The null hypothesis of a symmetrical distribution around a zero 
median can be rejected in all three cases at the 0.1% level.
16 
5.2  The impact of qualitative criteria on rating changes  
In the second stage of the analysis, the contribution of qualitative criteria to changes in the borrower 
rating is observed. The dependent variable DBR is defined as the difference between the overall 
ratings for two successive observation times. Three attributes are encoded: rating improvement (u), 
rating constancy (c), and rating deterioration (d). The factors to be studied that influence the 
borrower rating are the indicators for changes in both the qualitative and the quantitative sub-rating 
                                                 
14  Refer to the results for the original 8 and 10 risk classes of Bank A and Bank C respectively. In this case, the 
relative frequency of a deviation is 48% for Bank A and 82% for Bank. 
15  This test is also known as the Wilcoxon test for pair differences or the Wilcoxon matched pairs signed rank 
test. Cf. Sachs 1997. 
16In this test the absolute amounts of the m ( n m £ ) of the rating deviations different from zero ( 0 „ l ) are 
arranged in ascending order of rank, with the smallest observation ranked 1, the largest ranked m (in case of 
the same amounts, the middle rank numbers are assigned). Then the sum of positive ranks (l>0) and the sum 
of negative ranks (l<0) is formed. The test statistic used is the smaller of the two rank totals. If this is smaller 
than or equal to the critical value, the null hypothesis is rejected. For m>25, the critical value is approximately: 
( ) ( )( ) 1 2 1
24
1
4
1
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+
= m m m z
m m
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[up (u) / constant (c) / down (d)]. The reference variable in each case is the constant qualitative sub-
rating. Using this procedure, we can determine the effect of a qualitative improvement or 
deterioration depending on the attribute of the quantitative variable.
17 As already explained in Section 
5.1, the quantitative sub-rating QN contains all quantitative rating information of the relevant bank-
internal procedure. Correspondingly, the qualitative sub-rating QL comprises all qualitative rating 
information of the procedure. Of particular interest are the estimated coefficients of the indicator 
variables, which describe changes in the qualitative and quantitative sub-ratings in the opposite 
direction (uQNdQL; dQNuQL). Table 10 shows that, in Bank A, 4% of all cases and, in Banks B 
and C, 16-18% of all cases fall under one of the two "contradictory" categories. It can be noted for 
Bank A that the largest numbers occur in cases of a constant qualitative sub-rating (uQNcQL, 
dQNcQL, cQNcQL together make up 237 of 334 cases). 
  DBR 
  Bank A  Bank B  Bank C 
  u  c  d  Total  u  c  d  Total  u  c  d  Total 
uQNuQL  17  8  0  25  21  5  0  26  45  8  0  53 
uQNdQL  0  8  1  9  12  8  1  21  16  27  3  46 
uQNcQL  17  27  2  46  18  12  0  30  26  11  0  37 
dQNuQL  1  2  1  4  3  11  7  21  3  27  12  42 
dQNdQL  0  2  24  26  0  6  20  26  0  11  77  88 
dQNcQL  0  26  33  59  0  8  8  16  1  20  15  36 
cQNuQL  10  8  1  19  8  14  0  22  6  10  0  16 
cQNdQL  2  10  2  14  0  21  4  25  0  15  6  21 
cQNcQL  10  111  11  132  0  82  0  82  0  153  0  153 
Total  57  202  75  334  62  167  40  269  97  282  113  492 
Table 10:  Frequencies of the changes in sub-rating and overall rating, Banks A, B and C, 
1995/96. 
The "contradictory" cases are particularly interesting because they allow us to compare the 
dominance of quantitative or qualitative criteria. For example, Table 10 shows for Bank B that the 
resulting creditworthiness deteriorates in only one of 21 cases in which the quantitative sub-rating is 
upgraded while the qualitative sub-rating is downgraded. In 12 of the 21 cases the quantitative 
                                                 
17  The exogenous indicator variables are cQNuQL, cQNdQL, uQNuQL, uQNdQL, dQNuQL and dQNdQL, 
whereby cQNuQL indicates cases with a constant hard sub-rating and a soft upgrading, uQNdQL comprises 
cases with a quantitative upgrading and qualitative downgrading, and accordingly for the other variables. Information production in credit relationships 
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upgrade dominates the change in borrower rating. Similar observations are made for Bank C. From 
this, we can derive the result that, when the sub-ratings change in opposite directions, the impact of 
the quantitative change tends to dominate the effect on the overall rating. 
The hypothesis of the dominating impact of hard rating changes on the overall rating will be studied 
below by means of a probit analysis. As the implementation of the dependent variable DBR can take 
more than two values (u, c, d), an ordered probit analysis will be used. In keeping with the 
interpretation in the introduction to this article, rating classes are interpreted as an ordinal proxy value 
for the default probability of the loan. The latter is a continuous, latent variable. Through their 
algebraic sign, the estimated coefficients show the direction of the change in probability for a jump 
into one of the two boundary categories (up, down). With a minus sign, the probability of upgrading 
(downgrading) increases (decreases). The results of the analysis for the three Banks A, B and C are 
given in Table 11. 
The dependent variable "change in the borrower rating" DBR can take 3 indicator values. The parentheses 
contain z-values, where *** indicates the 1% significance level and ** the 5% significance level.  
  Ordered Probit (dependent variable DBR) 
Variables  Bank A  Bank B  Bank C 
cQNuQL    -1.18  (-4.08***)    -0.72  (-2.51**)    -0.83  (-2.60***) 
cQNdQL    -0.17  (-0.53)    0.65  (2.30**)    0.92  (3.17***) 
uQNuQL    -1.69  (-6.12***)    -1.89  (-6.11***)    -2.14  (-9.22***) 
uQNdQL    0.07  (0.18)    -1.07  (-3.63***)    -0.58  (-2.89***) 
dQNuQL    -0.17  (-0.29)    0.68  (2.35**)    0.71  (3.35***) 
dQNdQL    2.29  (6.14***)    2.18  (7.04***)    2.56  (12.47***) 
n    334    269    492 
LR statistics    120.21    139.20    375.53 
Pseudo R
2    0.19    0.28    0.39 
Table 11:  DBR as a function of changes in the hard and soft sub-ratings, Banks A, B and C, 
1995/96. 
The results can be interpreted as follows. The isolated changes in the qualitative sub-rating in both a 
positive and a negative direction (with the quantitative sub-rating remaining constant) have, in the 
rating procedures of Banks B and C in the sample studied, a significant impact (1% and 5% 
significance level) on the probability of a change being observed in the overall rating. In case of Bank 
A, this only applies for an upgrading of the qualitative sub-rating; when viewed in isolation, a 
downgrading of the qualitative sub-rating has no significant effect on the probability of a change in the Information production in credit relationships 
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overall rating. The negative sign of the coefficient of cQNuQL for all three banks means that an 
improvement in the qualitative sub-rating while the quantitative sub-rating remains constant increases 
the probability of an upgrading of the overall rating and lowers that of a downgrading. The 
significantly positive sign of the coefficient of cQNdQL for Banks B and C describes an increase in 
the probability of a downgrading of the overall rating at the same time as a qualitative deterioration 
and a constant quantitative sub-rating.  
Changes in the same direction in both the quantitative and the qualitative sub-rating (uQNuQL, 
dQNdQL) have a significant impact at the 1% level on the probability of a change in the overall 
rating in the expected direction. An improvement in the two sub-ratings increases (decreases) the 
probability of an upgrading (downgrading) of the overall rating, with a negative sign for the 
coefficient. A deterioration in both sub-ratings increases the probability of a downgrading 
accordingly.  
The indicator variables for opposite changes in the quantitative and the qualitative sub-rating 
(uQNdQL, dQNuQL) are significant for Banks B and C at the 1% and 5% level respectively. The 
improvement in the qualitative sub-rating with a deterioration in the quantitative sub-rating at the 
same time increases the probability of a downgrading of the overall rating (significantly positive sign 
of the coefficient of dQNuQL for B and C), and a qualitative downgrading at the same time as a 
quantitative improvement lowers the probability of a downgrading of the overall rating (significantly 
negative sign of the coefficient of uQNdQL for B and C). In the rating procedures of Banks B and 
C, therefore, the direction of the quantitative change dominates the overall effect when the sub-
ratings change in opposite directions. For Bank A, however, neither of the two indicators of opposite 
changes in the sub-rating is significantly different from zero.  
One might also ask how important soft and hard factors are in explaining rating changes in periods 
preceding a the financial distress of the borrower. The underlying hypothesis maintains that soft 
criteria in the borrower rating are particularly significant in predicting future rating deterioration. 
Therefore, in the period before distress and given informational efficiency, soft factors should cause a 
rating downgrade since their a ssessment is based on economic and financial forecasts for the 
borrower in question. Informational efficiency thus implies a quicker perception of an ongoing 
corporate crisis through soft information. On the other hand, the relationship manager who evaluates Information production in credit relationships 
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the client may have an incentive to hide the true state of the borrower from the senior bank manager 
if, for instance, his bonus payment depends on the quality of the loan portfolio he is in charge of, 
measured by the rating. In this case, he could try  to compensate a decline in the objective 
quantitative sub-rating by a overoptimistic evaluation of qualitative criteria which can hardly be 
verified. Thus, there are two hypotheses on qualitative rating changes in the period before financial 
distress to be investigated. The qualitative sub-rating may either go down, due to informational 
efficiency, or go up due to incentive problems. Using a data set on 130 distressed credit 
relationships
18 from a second survey [see Brunner/Krahnen 2000], we did not find any evidence that 
qualitative sub-rating behave in a way suggested by the incentive problem hypothesis. Instead, 
changes of qualitative sub-ratings are correlated with the downward trend of overall borrower 
quality. This result supports the hypothesis of information efficiency.  
6  Results and Conclusions  
The aim of this paper is to contribute to the ongoing discussion on the significance of internal ratings 
for the credit business in commercial banking. Our point of departure is theoretical considerations on 
the functioning of financial markets facing asymmetric information, and the roles of intermediaries 
therein [see Thakor 1995, or Rajan 1992 for an introduction]. From this perspective, banks are 
specialists in selecting and monitoring borrowers, as well as in designing efficient contracts, and –if 
necessary– renegotiating with them. The ongoing collection, processing and utilization of information 
on the borrower and his business prospects constitute a value added service for which intermediaries 
on the credit should earn a return, in equilibrium. The fee for this value added banking service can be 
collected either directly through a higher lending rate [Sharpe 1990] or indirectly through cross-
selling, the sale of associated services [Greenbaum/Kanatas/Venezia 1989, Elsas/Krahnen 1998]. 
Obviously, the competitive situation on any particular credit market will also play an important role in 
determining the most effective pricing policy [Broecker 1990, Boot/Thakor 1999]. 
                                                 
18  The selection mode of this survey required borrowers to show a negative rating (the last 2 out of 6 risk classes 
on a transformed rating scale for all banks included) at least once during the observation period from 1992-
1997. Information production in credit relationships 
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Our working hypothesis claims that internal ratings can be seen as the core competency of 
commercial banking. Without ratings, banks lose their lead in terms of information and assessment 
which, in an efficient lending market, define their competitiveness. A more precise view of the 
standard rating procedures directs our attention to the qualitative criteria. These, unlike quantitative 
criteria, are said to reflect the important private information, which is the quintessence of the 
economic advantage implied by close, long-term bank/customer relations (Ongena/Smith 1998). 
Using a new data set of internal bank ratings, we have tried to assess the role of qualitative sub-
ratings in determining the overall rating of borrowers' creditworthiness.  
Four results have been established :  
•  First, qualitative factors have a significant impact on the overall rating in the rating systems we 
analyzed.  
•  Second, qualitative and quantitative criteria are evaluated differently. The frequency distributions 
of qualitative and quantitative sub-ratings differ significantly. Qualitative criteria are systematically 
assessed more positively than quantitative criteria and show less dispersion across risk classes.  
•  Third, the impact of qualitative sub-ratings on the overall rating, which is measured as the 
difference between the quantitative sub-rating and overall rating, is generally positive. The 
qualitative sub-ratings upgrade the overall rating compared to the quantitative rating in about one 
third of cases . In an average of 55% of cases the qualitative sub-rating does not cause a a 
difference between quantitative sub-rating and overall rating. The distribution of the difference 
between the overall rating and the quantitative sub-rating shows asymmetry around its median 
zero. The frequency of rating adjustments caused by qualitative factors is higher in systems with 
fixed, preset weightings (Banks B and C) than in Bank A's system, where the weighting is 
intentionally left up to the individual expert. Moreover, systems of Banks B and C show higher 
rating activity, i.e. the probability that a rating is changed over a given period of time (one year), 
is significantly higher [see also Weber/Krahnen/Vossmann 1999]. Both observations together 
indicate the superior information processing of rating systems with preset weightings. 
•  Fourth, in cases of rating changes, the partial effects of quantitative and qualitative sub-rating 
changes are significant. In comparison, the cross effect of a qualitative rating change on an Information production in credit relationships 
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(opposing) quantitative rating change within systems featuring fixed aggregation weights shows 
an asymmetry in which the quantitative rating change is dominant. At first sight, this result 
contradicts the assumption sometimes expressed that the scope of discretion in assessing 
qualitative factors causes an incentive problem and results in an underestimation of the default 
risk by compensating for the deterioration of quantitative criteria with a more positive evaluation 
of qualitative criteria. Whether there remains a compensation that weakens the quantitative 
effect, but does not fully compensate it, has yet to be studied. This would have to reflect the 
extent of the rating change (number of risk classes) instead of its effect in the outline used here, 
featuring the three attributes: up/constant/down. 
We can therefore conclude that qualitative sub-ratings do play a significant role in our data, as is also 
the case in theory. However, it remains to be seen whether the heavy weighting of "soft" information 
is a desirable or problematic variable. In the present article we are satisfied to have developed and 
laid the groundwork for this question. Answering it would require a valid calibration of bank-internal 
ratings. Such a comparison, which assigns actual defaults and the corresponding transitional 
probabilities to rating classes and their changes, requires a long-term rating practice as well as a 
"good" rating model. In general, neither condition is met to a satisfactory degree at the present time. 
There are no generally accepted rating standards available, nor do there exist records of credit 
ratings covering lengthy timespans and including the actual default rates in such a way that they could 
be evaluated statistically. In our opinion, this represents an economically fascinating and a 
commercially relevant area to be researched over the coming years. Information production in credit relationships 
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